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the meaning of the exclusion of section 1245(a)(3)(B).5 We agree
with respondent.
The term "building" as used in section 48, and therefore as
applicable to our discussion, "has caused much consternation
among taxpayers and has produced a correspondingly large amount
of litigation." See Scott Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
137, 177 (1980). As a result, the term "building" has become a
term of art. See id. In this regard, it has long been
established that used in the context of section 48, Congress
intended that the term "building" be given its "commonly accepted
meaning, that is, a structure or edifice enclosing a space within
its walls, and usually covered by a roof." H. Rept. 1447, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), 1962-3 C.B. 405, 516; S. Rept. 1881, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), 1962-3 C.B. 707, 858-859; see, e.g.,
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. United States, 538 F.2d 790, 795-796
(8th Cir. 1976); Munford, Inc. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 463
(1986), affd. 849 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1988); Samis v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 609, 617 (1981); Valmont Indus., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1059, 1072 (1980); Satrum v. Commissioner,
62 T.C. 413, 416 (1974).
5 In the alternative, respondent argues that the Tobacco
Barn does not meet a number of the other requirements of sec.
1245(a)(3)(B)(i), (iii). However, because we agree with
respondent that the Tobacco Barn is a "building", we need not
consider these alternative arguments.
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