Osteopathic Medical Oncology and Hematology, P.C. - Page 27




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          method does not clearly reflect petitioner’s income.  On brief,             
          however, respondent’s argument as to why petitioner's use of the            
          cash method does not clearly reflect income articulates that the            
          chemotherapy drugs are merchandise that must be inventoried.                
          Respondent does not dispute that petitioner's use of the cash               
          method clearly reflects income to the extent that the                       
          chemotherapy drugs are not merchandise.  We need not and do not             
          engage in further analysis of the clear reflection of income                
          standard of section 446.6  See Concord Consumers Housing v.                 
          Commissioner, 89 T.C. 105, 106 n.3 (1987); Estate of Fusz v.                
          Commissioner, 46 T.C. 214, 215 n.2 (1966).  Based on the                    
          foregoing, we hold that respondent abused his discretion in                 
          requiring petitioner to use the hybrid method and that petitioner           
          may report all its income and expenses under the cash method.               
              We have considered all arguments in this case for a contrary           
          holding and, to the extent not discussed above, find those                  

               6 We are mindful of Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 796            
          F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1986), affg. in part and revg. in part Akers             
          v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-208, revd. on another issue 482            
          U.S. 117 (1987), wherein the Court of Appeals for the Sixth                 
          Circuit held that the taxpayer’s method of accounting did not               
          clearly reflect its income.  The setting of Asphalt Prods. Co. is           
          distinguishable from the setting at hand.  The issue there was              
          not the issue before us today; i.e., whether the furnishing of              
          pharmaceuticals by a medical treatment facility as an integral,             
          indispensable, and inseparable part of the rendering of medical             
          services is the sale of "merchandise" for purposes of section               
          1.471-1, Income Tax Regs.  That case also involved primarily a              
          significant accumulation of accounts receivable at yearend and              
          neither involved nor addressed whether the disputed items of                
          inventory (asphalt) were merchandise in the first place.                    




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