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speech, or employs a suspect classification, such as race. See,
e.g., id; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980).
Congress' power to categorize and classify for tax purposes
is extremely broad. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation,
supra; Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359
(1973); Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584
(1937); Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 26 (1916);
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 158 (1911); see also
Barter v. United States, 550 F.2d 1239, 1240 (7th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) (statutory difference in tax rates for married couples
and single individuals does not violate Due Process of law of the
Fifth Amendment; "perfect equality or absolute logical
consistency between persons subject to the Internal Revenue Code
[is not] a constitutional sine qua non"). In Regan v. Taxation
With Representation, supra at 547-548, the Supreme Court stated:
Legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating
classifications and distinctions in tax statutes. More
than forty years ago we addressed these comments to an
equal protection challenge to tax legislation:
"The broad discretion as to classification
possessed by a legislature in the field of taxation has
long been recognized. * * * The passage of time has
only served to underscore the wisdom of that
recognition of the large area of discretion which is
needed by a legislature in formulating sound tax
policies. * * * Since the members of a legislature
necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions
which this Court cannot have, the presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the most
explicit demonstration that a classification is a
hostile and oppressive discrimination against
particular persons and classes. The burden is on the
one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative
every conceivable basis which might support it."
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