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proceeds. Therefore, although the placing of the check proceeds
into escrow accounts pending resolution of disputes over the amount
of attorney's fees and the amount of Mrs. Sullivan's share of the
marital estate was a substantial restriction over petitioner's
ultimate disposition of the judgment proceeds, these restrictions
did not limit petitioner's legal entitlement to the judgment award
and interest in 1989. Because he received and endorsed the check
for the judgment with interest in 1989, that is the year in which
petitioner must report the entire amount of interest.
Respondent determined that petitioner was entitled to a
Schedule A deduction in the amount of $101,276 for attorney's fees
incurred in connection with earning the interest. The $101,276 is
approximately one-third of the amount of the interest. Petitioner
maintains that he should have received a deduction for attorney's
fees of 40 percent rather than 33-1/3 percent. Again, we disagree
with petitioner. During 1989, petitioner disputed the amount of
legal fees to be paid to Messrs. Valletta and Tarro. There is no
evidence in the record establishing that the legal fees were ever
more than 33-1/3 percent. Consequently, petitioner is not entitled
to a Schedule A deduction for attorney's fees in an amount greater
than that allowed by respondent.
In reaching our conclusions herein, we have considered all
other arguments presented by petitioner and, to the extent not
discussed above, find them to be irrelevant or without merit.
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