Mark and Helen Thomson - Page 6




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               Section 167(a) permits a depreciation deduction for, inter             
          alia, property used in a trade or business.  Pursuant to section            
          168(a), the depreciation deduction for any tangible property                
          generally is to be determined by using the applicable deprecia-             
          tion method, the applicable convention, and the applicable                  
          recovery period.  The parties’ dispute here is over the applica-            
          ble recovery period for the aircraft parts in question.                     
               For purposes of section 168, the applicable recovery period            
          in the case of 3-year property is 3 years, and the applicable               
          recovery period in the case of 5-year property is 5 years.  See             
          sec. 168(c).  Section 168(e)(1) classifies property as (1) 3-year           
          property if such property has a class life of 4 years or less and           
          (2) as 5-year property if such property has a class life of more            
          than 4 years but less than 10 years.                                        
               As pertinent here, the term “class life” is defined by                 
          section 168(i)(1), to mean, in general, the class life, if any,             
          which would be applicable with respect to any property as of                
          January 1, 1986, under section 167(m) (determined without regard            
          to section 167(m)(4) and as if the taxpayer had made an election            
          under section 167(m)), as in effect on the day prior to the date            
          of the enactment of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of                


          year to acquire various aircraft parts.  On brief, petitioners do           
          not advance that argument.  We therefore presume that petitioners           
          have abandoned their position at trial under sec. 165.  See Rybak           
          v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 524, 566 n.19 (1988).                              





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