William and Helen Woodral - Page 6




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          534, 542-543 (1940); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Commissioner, 107             
          T.C. 116, 128 (1996).  Phrases must be construed in light of the            
          overall purpose and structure of the whole statutory scheme.                
          Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 35 (1990).                 
               The plain meaning of statutory language ordinarily is                  
          conclusive.  United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S.              
          235, 241-242 (1989); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Commissioner,                 
          supra.  If the language of a statute is clear, we look no further           
          than that language in determining the statute's meaning.  See               
          Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 482 (1990); United States v.              
          Ron Pair Enters., Inc., supra at 241.  A court looks to                     
          legislative history only if the statute is unclear.  Blum v.                
          Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984); United States v. Lewis, 67               
          F.3d 225, 228-229 (9th Cir. 1995).                                          
          I.  Jurisdiction Under Section 6404(g)                                      
               The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and may               
          exercise jurisdiction only to the extent authorized by Congress.            
          Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985).  The question of           
          the Court's jurisdiction is fundamental and must be addressed               
          when raised by a party.  Id. at 530.                                        
               Section 6404(g) provides in pertinent part:                            
               The Tax Court shall have jurisdiction over any action                  
               brought by a taxpayer who meets the requirements                       
               referred to in section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) to determine                  
               whether the Secretary's failure to abate interest under                
               this section was an abuse of discretion, and may order                 
               an abatement, if such action is brought within 180 days                
               after the date of the mailing of the Secretary's final                 
               determination not to abate such interest.  [Emphasis                   
               added.]                                                                

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