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intended purpose for the payments is of no consequence." Thus,
we find that the parties' intent in this case, except as
reflected in the divorce or separation instrument itself, is
moot. We look to the agreements executed by the parties and
reject any arguments based on the settlement negotiations
mentioned above. The only relevant question is whether the
classification of payments as "property settlement" in the
Agreement or Judgment of Divorce is sufficient to satisfy section
71(b)(1)(B).
A cash payment satisfies section 71(b)(1)(B) if the divorce
agreement or other instrument does not designate such payment as
a payment which is not includable in gross income under section
71 and not allowable as a deduction under section 215. This
Court has previously held that the designation in the instrument
"need not specifically refer to sections 71 and 215". Estate of
Goldman v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 317, 323 (1999). However, the
statutory language of section 71(b)(1)(B) does not allow
designations by attenuated implication. Medlin v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1998-378. The "instrument must contain a clear,
explicit and express direction" that the payments are not to be
treated as income. Richardson v. Commissioner, 125 F.3d 551, 556
(7th Cir. 1997), affg. T.C. Memo. 1995-554. If there is no
express designation that the payments are not to be treated as
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