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to the Court for filing have the capacity to litigate in this
Court. See Rule 60(c); see also David Dung Le, M.D., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 268 (2000); Renaissance Enters. Trust v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-226.
Whether petitioner has the capacity to litigate in this
Court is determined by applicable State law, which, in this case,
appears to be the law of Virginia.4 See Rule 60(c). On the
basis of our review of that law and of the trust instrument, we
are unable to conclude that Mr. Jablonski, the only signatory on
the petition, had the requisite capacity to petition this Court
on petitioner’s behalf. Accord Mendenhall v. Douglas L. Cooper,
Inc., 387 S.E.2d 468 (Va. 1990); Raney v. Four Thirty Seven Land
Co., 357 S.E.2d 733, 736 (Va. 1987); Fisher v. Dickenson, 4 S.E.
737 (Va. 1888); cf. Walt Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 348 S.E.2d
223, 226 (Va. 1986) (the trustee of an antecedent deed of trust
is a necessary party in a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien).
Petitioner is purportedly an irrevocable trust, and Mr. Jablonski
is not petitioner’s trustee;5 Mr. Jablonski is listed on the
4 In addition to the fact that petitioner’s mailing address
is in Alexandria, Virginia, the trust instrument was executed in
that city.
5 The record does contain a letter dated Mar. 24, 2000, from
Mr. Jablonski to respondent’s counsel, that Mr. Jablonski signed
as “Trusttee” (sic). However, the trust instrument does not name
Mr. Jablonski as trustee. The record as a whole does not support
a finding that Mr. Jablonski is petitioner’s trustee.
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