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6015(c)(3)(C) places the burden of proof on the Commissioner; under
former section 6013(e) it was on the taxpayer. Second, section
6015(c)(3)(C) requires that the putative innocent spouse’s
knowledge be actual; former section 6013(e)(1)(C) required only
that the putative innocent spouse “know or have reason to know”.
Third, section 6015(c) requires that the putative innocent spouse
had the requisite knowledge “at the time such individual signed the
return”; former section 6013(e)(1)(C) required that he or she had
the requisite knowledge “in signing the return”. Fourth, section
6015(c) requires that the putative innocent spouse have the
requisite knowledge of “any item giving rise to a deficiency”;
former section 6013(e)(1)(C) required that the putative innocent
spouse know “that there was such substantial understatement”.
These broad structural changes, and the specific changes to the
knowledge requirement, dictate that we be cautious in applying
interpretations of former section 6013(e)(1)(C) to section 6015(c).
B. Legislative History
As stated, the knowledge requirement in section 6015(c) is
reasonably subject to different interpretations. We may consider
legislative history to resolve statutory ambiguity. See Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997); Golden Rod Farms, Inc.
v. United States, 115 F.3d 897, 899 (11th Cir. 1997). We
especially should respect legislative history where there is
unequivocal evidence of legislative purpose. See Huntsberry v.
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