- 19 -
as such. See id. at 56. The Supreme Court pointed out that
Patrick is similar to Gilmore, summarizing its analysis (ibid.)
as follows:
The principles held governing in that case are equally
applicable here. It is evident that the claims asserted by
the wife in the divorce action arose from respondent’s [the
taxpayer’s] marital relationship with her and were thus the
product of respondent’s personal or family life, not profit-
seeking activity. As we have held in Gilmore, payments made
for the purpose of discharging such claims are not
deductible as “business” [i.e., sec. 212(2)] expenses.
The Supreme Court in Patrick then commented as follows (id.
at 57):
We find no significant distinction in the fact that the
legal fees for which deduction is claimed were paid for
arranging a transfer of stock interests, leasing real
property, and creating a trust [in Patrick] rather than for
conducting litigation [as in Gilmore]. These matters were
incidental to litigation brought by respondent’s wife, whose
claims arising from respondent’s personal and family life
were the origin of the property arrangements. * * *
We note that the Supreme Court in Patrick did not even
bother to discuss another difference between Patrick and
Gilmore–-in Gilmore, the taxpayer won his divorce case and his
sought-for deductions were only for his expenses; in Patrick,
half of the taxpayer’s sought-for deductions were for expenses of
his wife, which the taxpayer paid under compulsion of the local
court order.
In the instant case, petitioner’s claimed deductions arose
from her payment of the relevant expenses of the other
beneficiaries, the Trustee, and the guardian ad litem.
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