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the Board nothing from April 15, 1993, through November 15, 1995.
The Statement refers only to petitioner’s 1993 tax year and does
not otherwise indicate whether petitioner owed the Board any
amount for prior years. On the basis of the two certificates, we
conclude that petitioner was “suspended” on the date that Mr.
Hagendorf filed a petition with this Court on its behalf and at
all times through September 29, 1999, the date on which the 90-
day period under section 6213(a) expired. Accordingly, we hold
that petitioner lacked the capacity under California law to
validate that petition as a legal filing and that it lacked the
authority to cause Mr. Hagendorf to file a valid petition on its
behalf. Cf. Rule 41(a) (“No amendment [to a pleading] shall be
allowed after expiration of the time for filing the petition * *
* which would involve conferring jurisdiction on the Court over a
matter which otherwise would not come within its jurisdiction
under the petition as then on file.”).
Nor are we persuaded by petitioner’s argument that the
current reinstatement of its powers as of February 28, 2000,
means that it can continue to litigate this case. In Condo v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 149, 151 (1977), we dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction because the corporate taxpayer did not have
the capacity to litigate under Rule 60(a). The taxpayer, like
petitioner, was a California corporation under suspension due to
its failure to pay State income/franchise tax. We noted with
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