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to his 1980 tax year, they are likewise the sole potential source
for the alleged overpayment. We find that Mr. Espinosa’s status
was and is that of a debtor to the IRS.
The above-quoted stipulation characterizing the IRS as a
creditor of Mr. Espinosa at the time of the transfer is likewise
sufficient to establish the second element, which requires the
IRS’s claim to have arisen prior to the transfer. In addition,
an identical result would be demanded, regardless of the
stipulation, by existing law. Tax liabilities accrue on the due
date of the tax return, and if such liabilities are not paid at
that time, the IRS is considered to be a creditor as of the close
of the applicable tax period. See Swinks v. Commissioner, 51
T.C. 13, 17 (1968); Locke v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-541;
O’Sullivan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-17; LaMothe v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-63. Here, since the transfer in
July of 1990 took place more than 4 years after Mr. Espinosa’s
tax return was due for the most recent of the tax periods upon
which transferee liability is based, the IRS’ claim predated the
transfer by a wide margin.
The third requirement, that the transferor must have
received no reasonably equivalent value in exchange, is once
again established by a stipulation of the parties: “The transfer
of the Lidak stock was made for love and affection. The parties
stipulate that love and affection is not adequate consideration.”
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