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Superior Court, supra, and concluded that under Indiana law only
three narrow exceptions exist to the general rule that all
divorce proceedings terminate on the death of one of the parties.
None of those exceptions are present in petitioner’s case. It
follows, therefore, that the provisional order here in issue
would have ceased to have any effect in the event of petitioner’s
death and that Mr. Heckaman’s obligation to make any payments
pursuant to it would have necessarily terminated.
Further, what is most pertinent to our inquiry is that under
Indiana law a provisional order is simply for the purpose of
maintenance and is distinct from a property settlement. Numerous
Indiana cases have held that “maintenance” is for the purpose of
supporting the receiving spouse. See Thatcher v. Thatcher, 496
N.E.2d 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Hicks v. Fielman, 421 N.E.2d
716, 721 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Wendorf v. Wendorf, 366 N.E.2d
703, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977). “It follows that maintenance, the
only other mechanism for transferring money, has no purpose other
than the support of the receiving spouse”. Hicks v.
Fielman, supra at 721.
Fitzgerald v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra at 162, states:
Unlike a final decree which is entered after either a
full hearing on all of the issues or after negotiation
and agreement by the parties, a provisional order is
only designed to maintain the status quo of the
parties. I.C. 31-1-11.5-7(f). Thus a final decree
divides the parties’ property, whereas a provisional
order does not.
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