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1969 and 1970 on the ground that the plan in actual operation had
not met the requirements of section 401 during those years.
The Court found that the legislative history indicated that
Congress did not intend that section 401(b) would set an
exclusive time period. We noted that Congress subsequently
amended section 401(b) to give the Commissioner discretion in
determining the amount of time to permit retroactive amendments.
Furthermore, the taxpayer had negotiated with the Commissioner in
good faith and acted in a timely manner. We concluded that
section 401(b) was not an exclusive timeframe, but was intended
to act only as a safe-harbor, and, therefore, the taxpayer’s
retroactive amendments were valid.
But we are faced with a different statute here. In cases
specifically dealing with the time limit of section
412(c)(10)(B), the Court has adhered to the strict language of
the statute and the regulations. See D.J. Lee, M.D., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 291 (1989), affd. 931 F.2d 418 (6th Cir.
1991); Wenger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-156. Moreover,
Aero Rental v. Commissioner, supra, has not been expanded to
apply outside of section 401, and it has been narrowly construed
within the confines of section 401. See, e.g., Bolinger v.
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1353, 1360-1361 (1981); Jack R. Mendenhall
Corp. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 676, 682 (1977); Pawlak v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-7. Finally, there is no indication
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