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Guidance gleaned from separate discussions of other factors
is no less ambivalent, and comparisons to previously decided
cases add little towards the resolution of the controversy here.
Other cases “turn upon their own facts and no useful purpose
would be served by reviewing the conclusions reached in other
cases based upon the records made therein.” Bessenyey v.
Commissioner, supra at 274.
Nothing in the record in this case suggests that petitioners
had any affectionate attachment to any of their race horses in
particular, or to horses in general. They did not use their
horses or farm for recreational purposes. Although mindful of
the suggestions to the contrary implicit in respondent’s
position, we simply can see no other reason why petitioners would
have engaged in the activity and incurred the resulting expenses
unless for profit. Taking into account the applicable factors as
a whole and considering the totality of the circumstances in this
case, we conclude that petitioners operated their horse racing
activity for profit during 1994. That being so, we find that
petitioners’ horse racing activity constituted a trade or
business during that year and they are entitled, under section
162(a) to some, but not all of the deductions here in dispute.
Deductions are a matter of legislative grace. A taxpayer
who claims a deduction must establish that all requirements of
the statute that allows the deduction have been satisfied. See
New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
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