- 5 -
Discussion
The discrepancy between the parties is attributable to two
aspects: (1) Whether petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees
at $250 per hour or whether he is limited to the statutory rate;
and (2) whether petitioner is entitled to fees and costs after
respondent’s January 12, 2000, offer to settle petitioner’s fee
and cost claims.
Petitioner argues that he is entitled to attorney’s fees
greater than the statutory limit because his attorney is uniquely
qualified to practice tax law and that such specialized knowledge
was needed to aid him through his procedural dilemma. Neither
respondent nor this Court questions the qualification of
petitioner’s counsel; the focus here is on the need, if any, for
specialized expertise that would justify payment above the
statutory limit. The circumstances here were “cut and dried”,
and petitioner had favorable appellate court precedent. The
legal quest was to cause respondent to acknowledge that
petitioner was entitled to a no-deficiency resolution of his case
and to compensate petitioner for his costs incurred in pursuing
that result. We cannot agree that such “lawyering” would warrant
a variation from the statutory limit. See, e.g., Huffman v.
Commissioner, 978 F.2d 1139, 1149-1150 (9th Cir. 1992), affg. in
part, revg. in part and remanding T.C. Memo. 1991-144; see also
Estate of Cervin v. Commissioner, 200 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2000),
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011