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years for purposes of section 6651(f). See Clayton v.
Commissioner, supra; Wallace v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-49.
Petitioner argues that he has been denied due process
because he was not allowed to argue with respondent’s agents at
the administrative level or during their testimony in Court about
his interpretation of the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code
and the regulations adopted under it. It is apparent that an
administrative hearing in this case would have been futile.
Neither his criminal conviction nor the Court’s rulings in this
case (which he characterized as “ridiculous”) have affected his
positions. His positions were certainly not going to be accepted
by the IRS.
Petitioner tried prior to and during the trial to withdraw
his petition. He was advised that he could not do so. See sec.
7459(d); Estate of Ming v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 519, 524 (1974).
He requested that the Judge recuse herself for bias because she
advised him in a telephone conference call that he would lose his
argument that he had no income. That warning to petitioner was
made in the context of notice to him about the provisions of
section 6673, discussed further below. The Court never indicated
any prejudgment on issues of fact, and advising petitioner of the
applicable law is not an indication of disqualifying bias. See,
e.g., United States v. Anderson, 433 F.2d 856-860 (8th Cir.
1970); Rowlee v. Commissioner, supra at 1117 n.4.
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