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While petitioner may make arguments in the alternative in a
single litigation, it is not allowed to succeed twice in
different suits on inconsistent factual and legal assertions. We
hold that petitioner’s conduct gives rise to circumstances that
demand the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. We
therefore hold that petitioner is estopped from asserting: (1)
Decedent had less than a full beneficial interest in the PCAB
shares at the time of the redemption, and (2) the shares had a
value that was equal to or less than $3 million.15
Petitioner next argues that the redemption transaction was
not a completed gift in 1987 because a breach of fiduciary duty
owed to the decedent occurred and/or because decedent was
defrauded. Petitioner argues that either or both events entitle
decedent to rescind the transaction. We disagree.
In May 1987, decedent and her son, Nikita Maggos, entered
into a transaction designed to minimize estate taxes and achieve
decedent’s testamentary goals. Both decedent and Nikita Maggos
were represented by independent and qualified attorneys in the
transaction. Nikita was represented by Mr. Bezman. Decedent’s
attorney at the time of the redemption transaction was Robert
Hite. We found Mr. Hite to be a credible, truthful, and
15Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment in this
Court claiming “that the record shows clearly that Ms. Maggos
[decedent] was defrauded because she transferred her PCAB shares
for less than adequate consideration”. Estate of Maggos v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-431.
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