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those previously asserted by the parties and accepted by courts
and that would result in inappropriate and prejudicial
consequences to the courts.” Huddleston v. Commissioner, supra
at 26. The doctrine focuses on the relationship between a party
and the courts, and it is intended to protect the latter. See In
re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1990). Whether or not to
apply the doctrine is within the court’s sound discretion. It
should be applied with caution in order “to avoid impinging on
the truth-seeking function of the court because the doctrine
precludes a contradictory position without examining the truth of
either statement.” Daugherty v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-
349 (citing Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1218
(6th Cir. 1990)).
We refuse to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel in the
present case. Assuming arguendo that Mr. Lane’s position in this
proceeding (that the policy was for Ms. Marten’s support) is
inconsistent with the position he took before the superior court
(that the policy was for Niklas’ care), there is no resulting
inappropriate or prejudicial consequence to this Court by hearing
his argument. We stated in Marten I that “it appears that at
least part of the premium payments was to ensure Niklas’
continued care.” We nonetheless concluded that the premium
payments were alimony pursuant to pre-DEFRA section 71 and Lester
v. Commissioner, 366 U.S. 299 (1961). In Lester v. Commissioner,
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