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Amendment when the Government demonstrates “that a challenged
requirement for government benefits, neutral and uniform in its
application, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate
public interest.” Id. at 708. The four dissenting Justices
would have required the Government to show that its refusal to
accommodate the appellants’ religious objection to the use of
SSN’s served a compelling State interest.4
In Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the
Supreme Court reviewed a claim that the Free Exercise Clause
permitted the ingestion of a prohibited drug, peyote, in the
context of the worship of the Native American Church. In so
doing, the Court held that a “neutral, generally applicable law
need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even
if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular
religious practice.” Id. at 886 n.3.
In response to Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. 103-141, sec. 2, 107
Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. secs. 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).5 A
person whose religious exercise is burdened in violation of the
4Justice White wrote separately from the other three
dissenters, stating simply that he believed Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963),
to be controlling.
5In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the
Supreme Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to
State and local laws. We assume without holding that the RFRA is
constitutional as applied to the Federal Government.
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