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for his position on this issue, asserting, in part, that the fact
“that there was no prior case authority under the facts of this
case * * * would appear to defeat petitioners’ argument that
respondent’s position [on this issue] was unreasonable.” We
disagree. We do not believe it reasonable for respondent to
assert an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) in a
case of first impression involving the unclear application of an
amendment to the Internal Revenue Code. See Bunney v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. (2000); Lemishow v. Commissioner, 110
T.C. 110, 114 (1998); Hitchins v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 711, 720
(1994); see also Everson v. United States, 108 F.3d 234, 237-238
(9th Cir. 1997). Given the lack of any precedent disfavoring
petitioners or favoring respondent, it was unreasonable for
respondent to have prosecuted his determination that petitioners
had not with substantial authority or in good faith taken a
position that petitioner’s tax home was in Orland Park, Illinois.
The accuracy-related penalty provisions do not apply to a nontax
shelter case to the extent that a taxpayer has substantial
authority for a position, see sec. 6662(d)(2)(B) and (C), and
substantial authority exists when the weight of authorities
supporting that position is substantial vis-a-vis the weight of
authorities supporting a contrary position, see sec.
1.6662-4(d)(3)(i), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners acted reasonably
and in good faith in taking their position. Subject to a narrow
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