Kenneth L. Musgrave and Etta D. Musgrave - Page 10




                                               - 10 -                                                  
            Interest Conveyed Under Texas Law                                                          
                  We find the reasoning of the two lines of cases to be                                
            reconcilable.  Leeson v. City of Houston, supra and its progeny                            
            stand for the proposition that as against parties not privies to                           
            the contract for deed, on execution of the contract for deed and                           
            upon entry onto the property the purchaser acquires all the                                
            benefits and burdens of ownership.  Simply stated, as against                              
            third parties the purchaser receives full equitable title when                             
            the contract is signed and the purchaser enters into possession.                           
                  In contrast, Johnson v. Wood, 157 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. 1941) and                         
            its progeny stand for the more limited proposition that as                                 
            against the vendor of the property the purchaser under a contract                          
            for deed has an equitable right to specific performance.  The                              

                  6(...continued)                                                                      
                        The Texas courts have uniformly held that a                                    
                  contract of sale such as is here involved does effect a                              
                  change of ownership.  Under such a contract the                                      
                  purchaser becomes full beneficial or equitable owner of                              
                  the property.  All that remains in the seller is a bare                              
                  legal title, more in the nature of a security title to                               
                  guarantee payment of the purchase price than anything                                
                  else.  The rule is summed up in 58 Tex. Jur. 2d 497,                                 
                  499, � 267, under the heading “Vendor and Purchaser,”                                
                  as follows: “The purchaser, however, acquires an                                     
                  equitable title or interest in the property from the                                 
                  date of the contract, or in any event from the time                                  
                  when he enters into possession, until his interest                                   
                  ripens into a legal title by an absolute conveyance or,                              
                  where the transaction consists in a conveyance and a                                 
                  reserved lien, by payment of the price or performance                                
                  of the contract.  The passing of the equitable title is                              
                  a matter of law and not a matter of stipulation in a                                 
                  contract.” [Bucher v. Employers Cas. Co., supra at                                   
                  584.]                                                                                





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