Newhouse Broadcasting Corp. and Subsidiaries, et al. - Page 19




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            cannot qualify under the transition rule for supply or service                             
            contracts.                                                                                 
                  In support of his argument, respondent relies on H. Conf.                            
            Rept. 99-841 at 60 (1986), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 4) at 60.  H. Conf.                           
            Rept. 99-841 is the report of the committee of conference                                  
            (conference report) accompanying H.R. 3838, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.                           
            (1985), which, when enacted, became the TRA of 1986.  Respondent                           
            relies primarily upon the following language in the conference                             
            report describing the supply or service transition rule in                                 
            support of his argument that the property must be specifically                             
            identified in pre-1986 documents:  "This transitional rule is                              
            applicable only where the specifications and amount of the                                 
            property are readily ascertainable from the terms of the                                   
            contract, or from related documents."  H. Conf. Rept. 99-841,                              
            supra at 60, 1986-3 C.B. at 60.  Respondent’s position appears to                          
            be that the description in the franchise agreement of property to                          
            be used in implementing such agreement is not sufficiently                                 
            detailed to meet that test.  Respondent also appears to be                                 
            arguing, that because of its inability to identify in any way the                          
            subject property, petitioner cannot sustain its burden of proving                          
            that such property is "readily identifiable with" (i.e.,                                   
            "specifically described" in) the franchise agreement.                                      
                  In opposition to petitioner’s motion, respondent argues that                         
            there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether all of                             






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