- 33 -
which is attributable to any partnership item” (which period
“shall not expire before” 3 years after the later of the filing
of the partnership return or its due date), the issuance of the
FPAA and the subsequent partnership-level litigation would
suspend the running of any applicable period of limitations. We
think that the latter interpretation is the correct one. We
recognize that the disputed statutory language is not a model of
clarity. Thus, in arriving at our conclusion that section
6229(d) suspends the running of any applicable period of
limitations when an FPAA is issued and during the pendency of
litigation in this Court, we again apply the well-established
rule stated by the Supreme Court in Badaracco v. Commissioner,
464 U.S. at 391-392:
“Statutes of limitation sought to be applied to bar
rights of the Government, must receive a strict
construction in favor of the Government.” E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924).
See also Lucas v. Pilliod Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 245, 249
(1930). More recently, Judge Roney, in speaking for
the former Fifth Circuit, has observed that
“limitations statutes barring the collection of taxes
otherwise due and unpaid are strictly construed in
favor of the Government.” Lucia v. United States, 474
F.2d 565, 570 (1973).[29]
Our interpretation of section 6229(d) conforms to the
general statutory scheme for allowing taxpayers to contest the
29See also Colestock v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 380, 387
(1994), and Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 863, 868 (1990),
affd. 954 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1992), in which we applied this
rule when interpreting provisions of the statute of limitations
in sec. 6501.
Page: Previous 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011