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Affairs and Counsel of the University, to be evasive in certain
material respects during his testimony. In addition, we some-
times had serious reservations as to whether Mr. Hart was testi-
fying from personal knowledge. As for Ms. Ary, Vice President
for Advancement of the University, she did not begin working for
the University until around 1993, a few years after the transac-
tion in question. She testified that it was her “understanding”
that petitioners had made a “gift” to the University in 1991 and
that she obtained that “understanding” from Mr. Hart, a witness
on whose testimony we generally are unwilling to rely.
As for petitioners’ reliance on labels, such as the label
“gift”, it is the substance of what transpired with respect to
the cancellation of MHR Properties’ St. Clair property interests
that is determinative for tax purposes, not the labels or termi-
nology employed. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435
U.S. 561, 573 (1978); Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308
U.S. 252, 255 (1939); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469
(1935). Consequently, we reject petitioners’ reliance on labels
to support their position under section 170.
Petitioners’ position that they are entitled to a charitable
contribution deduction as a result of the cancellation of MHR
Properties’ St. Clair property interests rests on the following
contentions that they advance on brief: (1) Petitioners, as the
8(...continued)
under sec. 170.
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