- 11 -
Petitioner cites Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-42-052 (July 21, 1986)
for the proposition that the Commissioner has known for many
years that gas production can qualify for more than one NGPA
classification. The fact that natural gas may qualify under more
than one NGPA classification does not entitle S/V to a double
credit under section 29.
Petitioner contends that Congress intended to provide
multiple incentives for natural gas production. Despite this, we
conclude that Congress did not provide double credits under
section 29 for the same natural gas.
Petitioner contends that we must liberally construe section
29, citing Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498,
501 (1932). We disagree. The U.S. Supreme Court stated in
Standard Nut Margarine Co. that definitions of things subject to
be taxed may not be extended beyond their clear import. See id.
Section 29 does not define things subject to tax. The denial of
double credits under section 29 is consistent with the long-
standing judicial preference for interpreting tax statutes,
absent a clear declaration of congressional intent, not to allow
double credits. See United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S.
678 (1969); Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62 (1934);
United Telecomms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 589 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir.
1978), affg. 67 T.C. 760 (1977) and 65 T.C. 278 (1975).
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011