- 13 -
supra at 26; CWT Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1054, 1062
(1982), affd. 755 F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 1985).
B. Analysis
Under the test articulated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the first
question we must ask when reviewing an agency’s interpretation of
a statute is whether Congress has addressed the precise question
under consideration and has expressed its intent as to its
resolution. The examination should begin with the language of
the statute. See Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d
1043, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
In deciding whether the regulation comports with the
statute’s plain language, we look to the ordinary usage or
settled meanings of the words used in the statute by Congress.
See Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 370 (1925).
There is a strong presumption that Congress expresses its
intention through the language it chooses. See INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987). Section 460 contains the
4(...continued)
underlying a provision, courts are not at liberty to strike down
the regulation merely because the taxpayer offers a more
attractive statutory interpretation. See id.
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