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which (3) could not have been decided without resolving the
issue.” In re Raiford, 695 F.2d 521, 523 (11th Cir. 1983); see
Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1381 (11th Cir. 1982). “The
use of a criminal conviction as conclusive of an issue in
subsequent civil litigation, though not universally accepted, is
well established today.” In re Raiford, 695 F.2d at 523. For
purposes of applying collateral estoppel, there is no difference
between a judgment of conviction based upon a guilty plea and a
judgment of conviction rendered after a trial on the merits. See
Arctic Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 68, 75 (1964); see
also United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir.
1988).
It is well settled that a conviction under section 7201
collaterally estops a taxpayer from denying fraud for purposes of
former section 6653(b).3 See Blohm v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d
1542, 1554 (11th Cir. 1993), affg. T.C. Memo. 1991-636; Amos v.
3 The substance of sec. 6653(b), before amendment by sec.
7721(a) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA
1989), Pub. L. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, 2395, now appears in
secs. 6651(f) and 6663, which are effective generally for returns
the due date of which is after Dec. 31, 1989. Before amendment
by OBRA 1989, sec. 6653(b)(1) provided:
In General.--If any part of any underpayment * * * of
tax required to be shown on a return is due to fraud, there
shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 75 percent of
the portion of the underpayment which is attributable to
fraud.
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