- 5 - to the Court for filing have the capacity to litigate in this Court. See Rule 60(c); see also David Dung Le, M.D., Inc. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 268 (2000); Renaissance Enters. Trust v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-226. Whether petitioner has the capacity to litigate in this Court is determined by applicable State law, which, in this case, appears to be the law of Virginia.5 See Rule 60(c). On the basis of our review of that law and of the trust instrument, we are unable to conclude that Mr. Jablonski, the only signatory on the petition, had the requisite capacity to petition this Court on petitioner’s behalf. Accord Mendenhall v. Douglas L. Cooper, Inc., 387 S.E.2d 468 (Va. 1990); Raney v. Four Thirty Seven Land Co., 357 S.E.2d 733, 736 (Va. 1987); Fisher v. Dickenson, 4 S.E. 737 (Va. 1888); cf. Walt Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 348 S.E.2d 223, 226 (Va. 1986) (the trustee of an antecedent deed of trust is a necessary party in a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien). Petitioner is purportedly an irrevocable trust, and Mr. Jablonski is not petitioner’s trustee; Mr. Jablonski is petitioner’s cosettlor and so-called managing director. The trust instrument does not define the term “managing director”, and it does not set forth the powers, duties, or responsibilities of a person such as 5 In addition to the fact that petitioner’s mailing address is in Alexandria, Virginia, both the trust instrument and the minutes of the initial trust meeting were executed in that city.Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011