Alacare Home Health Services, Inc. - Page 13




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            Cf. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1974)                               
            (where a taxpayer’s generally accepted method of accounting is                              
            made compulsory by a regulatory agency and that method clearly                              
            reflects income, it is almost presumptively controlling for                                 
            Federal tax purposes); Sprint Corp. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C.                               
            384, 403-404 (1997).                                                                        
                  Petitioner contends that we have sanctioned the use of a                              
            minimum expensing rule, citing Galazin v. Commissioner, T.C.                                
            Memo. 1979-206, in which we allowed the taxpayer to deduct the                              
            cost of a calculator due to the small amount of the expenditure                             
            ($52.45) and the relatively short (2-year) useful life of the                               
            asset.  Here, respondent disallowed deductions of $467,944 and                              
            $351,543 for the disputed items.  These amounts are not                                     
            comparable to the amount at issue in Galazin.  Cf. Sharon v.                                
            Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515, 527 (1976) (taxpayer must capitalize                             
            $801 bar examination fees and expenses to practice law in                                   
            California because amount was too large to disregard its capital                            
            nature), affd. 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978).                                               
                  We conclude that petitioner has not shown that its                                    
            accounting method clearly reflected income nor that it was an                               
            abuse of discretion for respondent to require petitioner to                                 
            change that method of accounting.  Thus, we hold that petitioner                            
            may not expense the cost of its assets that cost less than $500                             
            and that have a useful life greater than 1 year.                                            






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