Robert Baxter - Page 5




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               file a petition, and the express language of section                   
               6330(c)(2)(B) precludes de novo review of his tax                      
               liability in this proceeding.                                          
                    Davina Sego did not actually receive a statutory                  
               notice of deficiency. * * *                                            
               In Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 611, the Court also held:            
                    The applicable legal principles with respect to                   
               Davina Sego are set forth in Erhard v. Commissioner, 87                
               F.3d 273 (9th Cir. 1996), affg. T.C. Memo. 1994-344,                   
               and Patmon & Young Professional Corp. v. Commissioner,                 
               55 F.3d 216, 218 (6th Cir. 1995), affg. T.C. Memo.                     
               1993-143, which held that taxpayers cannot defeat                      
               actual notice by deliberately refusing delivery of                     
               statutory notices of deficiency.  Petitioners’ conduct                 
               in this case constituted deliberate refusal of delivery                
               and repudiation of their opportunity to contest the                    
               notices of deficiency in this Court, which provides the                
               prepayment option for disputing tax liability.  (They                  
               still have the option, however, of paying the tax and                  
               instituting suits for refund.)  The provisions in                      
               section 6330(c)(2)(B) limiting in collection due                       
               process cases their right to contest the underlying tax                
               liability are clearly intended to prevent the creation                 
               of a belated prepayment remedy in cases such as this                   
               one.  The validity of the underlying tax liability is                  
               not properly before the Court.                                         
               The facts in the instant case are substantially similar to             
          those pertaining to Davina Sego.                                            
               Based upon the foregoing and considering the colloquy                  
          between the Court and petitioner at the January 22, 2001, hearing           
          on respondent’s motion to dismiss, we find as a fact that                   
          petitioner refused delivery of the statutory notice of deficiency           
          for 1995 mailed to him on April 29, 1998.                                   
               On March 13, 1999, approximately 1 year after respondent               
          mailed to petitioner the notice of deficiency for the year 1995,            






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