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file a petition, and the express language of section
6330(c)(2)(B) precludes de novo review of his tax
liability in this proceeding.
Davina Sego did not actually receive a statutory
notice of deficiency. * * *
In Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 611, the Court also held:
The applicable legal principles with respect to
Davina Sego are set forth in Erhard v. Commissioner, 87
F.3d 273 (9th Cir. 1996), affg. T.C. Memo. 1994-344,
and Patmon & Young Professional Corp. v. Commissioner,
55 F.3d 216, 218 (6th Cir. 1995), affg. T.C. Memo.
1993-143, which held that taxpayers cannot defeat
actual notice by deliberately refusing delivery of
statutory notices of deficiency. Petitioners’ conduct
in this case constituted deliberate refusal of delivery
and repudiation of their opportunity to contest the
notices of deficiency in this Court, which provides the
prepayment option for disputing tax liability. (They
still have the option, however, of paying the tax and
instituting suits for refund.) The provisions in
section 6330(c)(2)(B) limiting in collection due
process cases their right to contest the underlying tax
liability are clearly intended to prevent the creation
of a belated prepayment remedy in cases such as this
one. The validity of the underlying tax liability is
not properly before the Court.
The facts in the instant case are substantially similar to
those pertaining to Davina Sego.
Based upon the foregoing and considering the colloquy
between the Court and petitioner at the January 22, 2001, hearing
on respondent’s motion to dismiss, we find as a fact that
petitioner refused delivery of the statutory notice of deficiency
for 1995 mailed to him on April 29, 1998.
On March 13, 1999, approximately 1 year after respondent
mailed to petitioner the notice of deficiency for the year 1995,
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