Brazoria County Stewart Food Markets, Inc. - Page 11




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          $1,352,433 of unrecoverable debt was attributable to its advances           
          to UPE.  Included within petitioner’s claimed deduction was the             
          amount of $111,984.67, which represented the balance on UPE’s               
          loan from Grocers that petitioner had paid off.  The deduction              
          was the basis for a claimed net operating loss that was carried             
          back to petitioner’s 1991 and 1992 tax years.                               
                                       OPINION                                        
               The sole issue we consider is whether petitioner is entitled           
          to a business bad debt deduction for its 1994 tax year.3  Bad               
          debts that become worthless within the taxable year are                     
          deductible by a corporate taxpayer as ordinary losses under                 
          section 166(a).  The right to a deduction is limited to genuine             
          debt, and specifically, contributions to capital are not                    
          considered debt for the purposes of section 166(a)(1).  See                 
          Raymond v. United States, 511 F.2d 185, 189 (6th Cir. 1975); sec.           
          1.166-1(c), Income Tax Regs.  Before a bad debt deduction may be            
          taken under section 166(a), a taxpayer must establish the                   


               3 At trial, near the conclusion of petitioner's case-in-               
          chief, petitioner’s counsel stated that petitioner would not be             
          relying on the alternative theory that petitioner was entitled to           
          interest expense deductions under sec. 163.  As a result,                   
          respondent limited his cross-examination of at least one of                 
          petitioner's witnesses and rested without offering any witnesses            
          of his own.  Thereafter, petitioner resurrected and argued the              
          sec. 163 issue on brief in spite of its concession at trial.                
          Such behavior is impermissible and prejudicial to respondent.               
          Accordingly, petitioner is precluded from urging its alternative            
          theory under sec. 163.  See Seligman v. Commissioner, 84 T.C.               
          191, 198-199 (1985).                                                        





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