Estate of Theodore C. Chemodurow, Deceased, Gail C. Williams, Executor - Page 20




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          Ms. Williams’ averments in the complaint that:  “Plaintiff is the           
          sole owner of the Property [Abagail Ranch]”, and “Plaintiff has             
          obtained her ownership rights in the Property by operation of law           
          and warranty deed.”  Ms. Williams’ prayers for relief (including            
          the prayer set forth above) were denied.  Moreover, the State               
          court’s findings and conclusions of law directly contradict                 
          petitioner’s averments in this case:  “On November 16, 1981,                
          * * * [decedent] sold the Abagail Ranch to his daughter Gail                
          Chemodureau”, and “Gail is the true owner of the Abagail Ranch”.            
          Respondent has satisfied the first of the Peck requirements; the            
          identical issue was decided in the first suit (Cause No. 96-109)            
          as is raised here, viz., whether decedent sold the Abagail ranch            
          to Ms. Williams.                                                            
               Respondent has also satisfied the fourth of the Peck                   
          requirements; ownership of the Abagail ranch was actually                   
          litigated and the answer to that question was essential to the              
          result in the first suit (Cause No. 96-109), i.e., that Ms.                 
          Williams held the Abagail ranch only as a constructive trustee              
          for the benefit of the “Estate of [decedent]”.                              
               The Judgment in Cause No. 96-109 was entered, became final,            
          and was satisfied.  Petitioner has failed to show that the                  
          controlling facts or applicable law have changed since those                
          events occurred.  Thus, respondent has satisfied the second and             
          fifth Peck requirements.  Since petitioner does not challenge the           
          third Peck requirement, viz., whether petitioner is a party, or             




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Last modified: May 25, 2011