Christopher K. and Brenda M. Cox, et al. - Page 18




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               If Deborah’s argument is that she is entitled to exclude a             
          portion of the annual lease value of the automobile from her                
          gross income, as we interpret it to be, her argument would appear           
          to be grounded in section 132.  Section 132 provides that gross             
          income does not include any fringe benefit that qualifies as a              
          working condition fringe.  Sec. 132(a)(3).  A working condition             
          fringe is defined as “any property * * * provided to an employee            
          of the employer to the extent that, if the employee paid for such           
          property * * * such payment would be allowable as a deduction               
          under section 162 or 167.”  Sec. 132(d).  The value of property             
          or services furnished to an employee by an employer, however, may           
          not be excluded from an employee’s gross income as a working                
          condition fringe pursuant to section 132 unless the                         
          substantiation requirements of either section 274(d) or section             
          162, whichever is applicable, and related regulations are                   
          satisfied.  Sec. 1.132-5(c)(1), Income Tax Regs.                            
               Section 274(d) provides that no deduction is allowed with              
          respect to the use of “listed property”, as defined in section              
          280F(d)(4), unless certain elements are substantiated.  See sec.            
          1.274-5T(e)(1)(i), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46026           
          (Nov. 6, 1985).  A passenger automobile of the type furnished to            
          Deborah qualifies as listed property under section                          
          280F(d)(4)(A)(i).  Hence, Deborah must satisfy the substantiation           
          requirements of section 274(d) in order to argue successfully she           






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