Estate of Marguerite M. Cranor, Deceased, John R. Phillips, Jr., Administrator ad Litem - Page 9




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          which the petition “is mailed” refers to the September 3                    
          envelope, not the September 16 envelope.  Surely a taxpayer would           
          not prevail if the timely mailed envelope did not bear the                  
          correct postage but the second, untimely envelope did.  For                 
          petitioner to qualify under section 7502(a), the September 3                
          envelope must have been timely sent, been properly addressed, and           
          borne the correct postage.  That is, the envelope must have                 
          complied with the requirements of section 7502(a).  The September           
          3 envelope meets these requirements.                                        
               This reading of section 7502 is consistent with Price v.               
          Commissioner, 76 T.C. 389, 391, 394 (1981).  In Price, the                  
          petition contained in a timely mailed envelope was returned to              
          the taxpayer, who remailed it in an outer envelope after the 90-            
          day period.  See id.  We held that the inner envelope, postmarked           
          by the Postal Service within the prescribed period but containing           
          an incorrect ZIP code, was properly addressed.  See id.2  The               
          original envelope in Price was mailed by certified mail.                    
          However, that fact is irrelevant here because the certified mail            
          exception of section 7502(c)(2) establishes only that an envelope           




               2But cf. Cho v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-5, which                 
          concluded that an original envelope that was returned to the                
          taxpayer for insufficient postage and then remailed to the Court            
          in another envelope was not “delivered” to the Court for purposes           
          of sec. 7502.  The facts of Cho are distinguishable from those of           
          the instant case in that the original envelope in Cho did not               
          meet the prepaid postage requirement of sec. 7502(a)(2).                    




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