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presumption of correctness since the taxpayer did not directly
attack that presumption. Also as in Rapp, petitioner challenged
the amount of related deductions respondent had allowed her,
which we view as an implicit acknowledgment of the existence of
the income-producing property. Rapp lends support to our
conclusion that respondent did establish a minimum evidentiary
foundation.
Moreover, in the various documents petitioner has filed in
this case, she makes statements that we read as her concession
that, during the years in issue, she did, indeed, own real
property from which she received rental income: To wit, “ALL OF
THE ‘INCOME’ AT ISSUE WAS DERIVED FROM RENT”; “[respondent is]
attempt[ing] to put an income tax on Petitioner’s rental income”;
“Petitioner’s real estate rents are not subject to an income tax
as a matter of law”; “Well, they were willing to contact former
tenants, but they weren’t willing to call, for example, the
Multnomah County Tax Assessor”; “I have no wages, salaries or
profits from my rental property”. In Edwards v. Commissioner,
680 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1982), although no specific income was
documented, the Court of Appeals upheld the presumption of
correctness because the taxpayers had conceded that they owned an
income-producing business. We think that a like result is called
for here.
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