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controlling where, as here, we are dealing with mortgage
indebtedness under section 2053(a)(4). (Respondent cites only
section 2053(a)(4) in support of the Government’s position on
inclusion.) Moreover, while we pointed out in Estate of Theis v.
Commissioner, 81 T.C. 741, 749-750 (1983), affd. 770 F.2d 981
(11th Cir. 1985), that section 2053(a)(4) was not intended to
apply where the decedent was only secondarily liable or an
accommodation party, we went on to state that “Section 20.2053-7,
Estate Tax Regs., like section 2053(a)(4), was intended to cover
situations involving the liability for mortgages on a decedent’s
own property.” Thus, Estate of Theis v. Commissioner, supra,
hardly stands for the principle that practicalities should
override legal liability where a decedent is the named primary
obligor, on an explicitly recourse note, encumbering his or her
own fee interest in a parcel, particularly where the transaction
involved no third parties whom the decedent might have been
accommodating.
Furthermore, this Court has previously embraced the notion
that potential liability can be sufficient for purposes of
section 20.2053-7, Estate Tax Regs., in a case somewhat analogous
to that now before the Court. In Estate of Linderoth v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-547, a residence was encumbered by
deeds of trust securing promissory notes. The property was
located in Nevada, where a statutory “one action rule” could
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