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petitioner’s argument for well-established reasons. First, the
income tax repeatedly has been held constitutional. See Charczuk
v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 471, 472-473 (10th Cir. 1985), affg.
T.C. Memo. 1983-433; Abrams v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 403, 406-407
(1984); Bivolcic v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-62; see also
Stelly v. Commissioner, 761 F.2d 1113, 1115 (5th Cir. 1985)
(listing cases in each circuit holding the income tax
constitutional). Second, section 61(a) defines gross income
generally as “all income from whatever source derived,”
including, but not limited to, compensation for services,
commissions, interest, dividends, and pensions. See sec.
61(a)(1), (4), (7), (11). Section 85(a) provides: “In the case
of an individual, gross income includes unemployment
compensation.” Under section 61(a)(1), (4), (7), and (11), and
section 85(a), petitioner clearly is required to include in gross
income all his receipts in the years in issue.
Petitioner contends that income is defined only by section
911 and the regulations under section 861 and that his receipts
are excluded from those definitions. Neither section 911 nor
section 861 operates to prevent section 61 from applying to
petitioner’s receipts. See Solomon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1993-509, affd. without published opinion 42 F.3d 1391 (7th Cir.
1994).
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