- 6 -
of any of those deductions. Therefore, even if petitioner may
have incurred some deductible expense in pursuing his Schedule C
activity, we have no basis whatsoever on which to approximate an
allowance. See Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th
Cir. 1957); Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 743 (1985); see
also Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930);
cf. sec. 274(d)(4), providing that no deduction is allowable with
respect to any “listed property”, such as a passenger automobile
or other property used as a means of transportation, on the basis
of any approximation or the unsupported testimony of the
taxpayer; Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 827 (1968), affd.
per curiam 412 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1969); Golden v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1993-602; sec. 1.274-5T(a), Temporary Income Tax
Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46014 (Nov. 6, 1985).
Rather, at trial, petitioner, while admitting that he was
obliged to file an income tax return, argued that respondent had
no right to examine it. The sheer folly of this assertion
requires no response. See Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417
(5th Cir. 1984); see also sec. 7602(a).3
3 To the extent that any of petitioner’s musings at trial
may imply reliance on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, we note: (1) The deductions in issue were claimed
by petitioner on his return, and (2) a claim based on the
privilege, even if well founded, is not a substitute for relevant
evidence. United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758 (1983);
Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 661, 684-685 (1989); Tinsman v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-55, affd. without published opinion
(continued...)
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