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the parent of an individual in order for that individual to be
the taxpayer’s dependent under section 152(a)(9).
Second, as to Dustin and Kristion, respondent argues that
petitioner does not meet the requirements of any of the various
provisions of section 152(e)(1)-(4). Section 152(e), which
contains rules for divorced or separated parents treating one or
the other as having provided over half a child’s support, is
inapplicable in this case. Section 152(e)(1) is inapplicable
because petitioner, not the children’s parents, provided over
half of their support, as discussed below. Section 152(e)(2) is
inapplicable because nothing in the record indicates, nor does
respondent even suggest, that Mendy signed a written declaration
releasing her claim to the exemptions in favor of the biological
father. Section 152(e)(3) is inapplicable because petitioner
provided over half of the children’s support, making a multiple
support agreement impossible. See sec. 152(c)(1). Finally,
section 152(e)(4) is inapplicable because there is no qualified
pre-1985 instrument involved in this case.
Respondent’s third and final argument is that petitioner did
not provide over half of the support for Dustin, Kristion, or
Brittany. However, the four witnesses at trial testified that
petitioner contributed more than half of such support, and we
find that the evidence supports this testimony. Petitioner had
available to contribute to the payment of the children’s expenses
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Last modified: May 25, 2011