- 12 -
Memo. 1997-328, this is not such a case.
We have consistently held that we will not apply the Cohan
approach unless the taxpayer presents evidence sufficient to
provide some rational basis on which an estimate may be made.
See Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 743 (1985). Without
such evidence, any allowance would amount to unguided largesse.
See Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957);
see also Millsap v. Commissioner, supra.4
In the present case, petitioner offered no evidence
whatsoever that would provide a rational basis on which an
estimate might be made. In this regard, we note that petitioner
offered nothing other than his own testimony. However,
petitioner’s testimony was invariably conclusory, frequently
improbable, and occasionally fantastical. See Lovell & Hart,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 456 F.2d 145, 148 (6th Cir. 1972) (the Tax
Court is not required to accept a taxpayer’s testimony if it is
improbable, unreasonable, or questionable), affg. T.C. Memo.
4 The following passage from Millsap v. Commissioner, 46
T.C. 751, 760 (1966), affd. 387 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1968), is
particularly apt:
There have been cases where a failure of proof on the
issue of basis has been overlooked to permit the
allowance of a small casualty loss deduction where it
could reasonably be inferred from other facts of record
that the allowed amount did not exceed basis, but this
is not such a case. We do not feel that application of
the Cohan rule is appropriate here on the question of
basis. [Fn. ref. omitted.]
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011