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Their first argument is that section 280A is not applicable to
their rental of rooms in their personal residence because
Congress intended the statute to apply only to vacation homes.
Petitioners base their argument on the explanations of the
statute’s provisions in both the Senate and House reports which
focus on the limitation imposed on deductions attributable to the
rental of a vacation home.
The starting point for construing the meaning of a statute
must be the language used by Congress. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979). We assume that the legislative purpose
is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. Richards
v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962). Thus, absent a clearly
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language
must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. Am. Tobacco Co. v.
Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982); Consumer Prod. Safety Commn.
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
We have previously rejected petitioner’s argument, observing
that the plain language of section 280A contains no such
limitation. Russell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-96, affd.
without published opinion 76 F.3d 388 (9th Cir. 1995); Gilchrist
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-288. Petitioners acknowledge
that section 280A is entitled “DISALLOWANCE OF CERTAIN EXPENSES
IN CONNECTION WITH BUSINESS USE OF HOME, RENTAL OF VACATION
HOMES, ETC.” and that the language of the statute is not
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