- 7 -
1996), affg. T.C. Memo. 1995-183. In determining whether payments
constitute alimony or a division of property, we are not bound by
the labels assigned to the payments by the parties in their
agreement. See Hesse v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 685, 691 (1973),
affd. without published opinion 511 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1975). On
the other hand, in deciding the character of an award in a divorce
or separation decree, we give great weight to the language and
structure of the decree. See, e.g., Griffith v. Commissioner, 749
F.2d 11, 13 (6th Cir. 1984), affg. T.C. Memo. 1983-278. Whether
payments represent support or a property settlement is a question
of the parties’ intent. See Hoover v. Commissioner, supra at 845.
We ascertain this intent not only from the underlying agreement but
from the particular facts and circumstances involved. See, e.g.,
Boucher v. Commissioner, 710 F.2d 507, 509 (9th Cir. 1983), affg.
T.C. Memo. 1981-258.
This Court has frequently looked to State law in considering
whether payments between spouses constitute alimony or a property
settlement. See Yoakum v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 128, 140 (1984).
Here, the applicable State law is that of North Carolina, and we
therefore look to the law of that State. Under North Carolina law
(as existing at the time of petitioner’s divorce), military
retirement pay was the separate property of the spouse who had
served in the military (here, Mr. Mozley) and was not subject to
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