U.R. Neely - Page 12




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          under section 6501(c)(1) is the same as the determination of                
          fraud for purposes of the penalty under section 6663, see Rhone-            
          Poulenc Surfactants & Specialties v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 533,            
          548 (2000), and an extensive body of law exists addressing the              
          fraud penalty in the income, estate, and gift tax contexts.  We             
          shall rely on such case law in our analysis below.                          
               Fraud is defined as an intentional wrongdoing designed to              
          evade tax believed to be owing.  See Edelson v. Commissioner, 829           
          F.2d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 1987), affg. T.C. Memo. 1986-223; McGee             
          v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 249, 256 (1973), affd. 519 F.2d 1121               
          (5th Cir. 1975).  The Commissioner bears the burden of proving              
          fraud and must establish it by clear and convincing evidence.               
          See sec. 7454(a); Rule 142(b).  To satisfy the burden of proof,             
          the Commissioner must show that (1) an underpayment in tax                  
          exists, and (2) the taxpayer intended to conceal, mislead, or               
          otherwise prevent the collection of taxes.  See Parks v.                    
          Commissioner, 94 T.C. 654, 660-661 (1990).                                  
               Petitioner concedes that his failure to include the cash               
          payments made to the workers on the appropriate employment tax              
          returns resulted in an understatement in tax.  Accordingly, we              
          focus on whether the understatement was a product of fraudulent             
          intent.  As described below, the record in this case does not               
          support a finding that petitioner acted with an intent to                   
          conceal, mislead, or otherwise prevent the collection of taxes.             
               Petitioner testified that he believed the employment tax               




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