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Ms. Olsen to sell the property to a third party, or a written
consent or ratification of the transfer to a third party.
Petitioner cites Read v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 14 (2000),
to support his contention that the transfer of the Tryon Road
property to North Fork Timber Company was on behalf of Ms. Olsen.
We find petitioner’s reliance on Read misplaced. In Read, we
held that Ms. Read’s transfer of MMP3 stock to MMP was “on behalf
of” Mr. Read (the nontransferring spouse) because it qualified
under the first situation described in Q&A-9. Id. at 37-38.
According to the divorce agreement in that case, Mr. Read, or at
his election MMP or MMP’s ESOP, was obligated to purchase Ms.
Read’s MMP stock. See id. at 17-19. As stated above, petitioner
failed to show that any of the three situations described in Q&A-
9 were satisfied.
In Ingham v. United States, 167 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1999),
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit4 held that transfers
of property to a third party on behalf of a former spouse qualify
for nonrecognition if the transfer satisfied an obligation or a
3 MMP was a corporation wholly owned by Mr. Read and Ms. Read.
4 According to the rule set forth in Golsen v. Commissioner,
54 T.C. 742, 756-757 (1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971),
we are obligated to follow the law as stated by the Court of
Appeals in the circuit to which a case would be appealable.
Accordingly, we are bound by the reasoning in Ingham v. United
States, 167 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1999).
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