Nina H. Pettyjohn - Page 21




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          this Court.  It was not until the following summer that                     
          respondent’s Appeals Office in Atlanta sent petitioner a proposed           
          stipulated decision reflecting a deficiency based solely on the             
          disallowance of the deduction for gifts to family members.                  
               By a certified letter dated October 27, 1998, respondent               
          exercised his discretion to abate interest for the period from              
          August 22, 1996, to July 7, 1997, because of the “ministerial               
          delay in associating your reply to the original 30-day letter               
          with the case file.”  However, any delay after July 7, 1997, was            
          attributable to petitioner’s unjustified refusal to sign the                
          proposed stipulated decision until mid-October, which delayed               
          entry of decision by the Court until mid-November.  See sec.                
          6404(e)(1) (“an error or delay shall be taken into account only             
          if no significant aspect of such error or delay can be attributed           
          to the taxpayer involved”).  Notably, the Court’s decision                  
          included a stipulation by the parties that interest would be                
          assessed “as provided by law on the deficiency in tax due from              
          petitioner.”                                                                
               In our view, the record does not reveal any ministerial                
          error or delay by respondent, other than as conceded by                     
          respondent.  Accordingly, we hold that respondent did not abuse             
          his discretion in refusing to abate interest for the period from            
          July 19 to August 21, 1996, and for the period from July 8, 1997,           
          to October 13, 1999, the date on which petitioner’s account was             
          fully paid.                                                                 







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