James A. Rochelle - Page 19





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          1998 Act, the word “shall” was intended to be directory rather              
          than mandatory.  Indeed, the full text of section 3463 of the               
          1998 Act (set forth supra in the majority’s opinion p. 5) shows             
          that “shall” appears in each subsection of section 3463 of the              
          1998 Act; thus far it has not been seriously suggested that                 
          “shall” is other than mandatory as it appears in subsections (b)            
          and (c).  Giving “shall” the same meaning in each of the three              
          places it appears in section 3463 of the 1998 Act, I conclude               
          that the Congress’ choice of that word in subsection (a) mandates           
          the Commissioner to state on the notice of deficiency what is the           
          last date for petitioning this Court.  See United States v.                 
          Olympic Radio & Television, 349 U.S. 232, 236 (1955);1 Estate of            
          Owen v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 498, 507-508 (1995) (and cases               
          cited therein); Office of the Legislative Counsel, U.S. House of            
          Representatives, Style Manual, Drafting Suggestions for the                 





               1In United States v. Olympic Radio & Television, 349 U.S.              
          232, 236 (1955), the Supreme Court instructed as follows:                   
               It may be that Congress granted less than some thought or              
               less than was originally intended.  We can only take the               
               Code as we find it and give it as great an internal symmetry           
               and consistency as its words permit.  We would not be                  
               faithful to the statutory scheme, as revealed by the words             
               employed, if we gave “paid or accrued” a different meaning             
               for the purposes of section 122(d)(6) [I.R.C. 1939] than it            
               has in the other parts of the same chapter.                            
          To the same effect see Commissioner v. Keystone Consol.                     
          Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 159 (1993).                                 




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