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1998 Act, the word “shall” was intended to be directory rather
than mandatory. Indeed, the full text of section 3463 of the
1998 Act (set forth supra in the majority’s opinion p. 5) shows
that “shall” appears in each subsection of section 3463 of the
1998 Act; thus far it has not been seriously suggested that
“shall” is other than mandatory as it appears in subsections (b)
and (c). Giving “shall” the same meaning in each of the three
places it appears in section 3463 of the 1998 Act, I conclude
that the Congress’ choice of that word in subsection (a) mandates
the Commissioner to state on the notice of deficiency what is the
last date for petitioning this Court. See United States v.
Olympic Radio & Television, 349 U.S. 232, 236 (1955);1 Estate of
Owen v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 498, 507-508 (1995) (and cases
cited therein); Office of the Legislative Counsel, U.S. House of
Representatives, Style Manual, Drafting Suggestions for the
1In United States v. Olympic Radio & Television, 349 U.S.
232, 236 (1955), the Supreme Court instructed as follows:
It may be that Congress granted less than some thought or
less than was originally intended. We can only take the
Code as we find it and give it as great an internal symmetry
and consistency as its words permit. We would not be
faithful to the statutory scheme, as revealed by the words
employed, if we gave “paid or accrued” a different meaning
for the purposes of section 122(d)(6) [I.R.C. 1939] than it
has in the other parts of the same chapter.
To the same effect see Commissioner v. Keystone Consol.
Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 159 (1993).
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