Jeffrey Tamms - Page 9




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          for-profit activity.  Allen v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 28, 32-33              
          (1979).                                                                     
               The taxpayer bears the burden of establishing that his or              
          her activities were engaged in for profit.4  Rule 142(a).  To               
          carry this burden, the taxpayer must show that he or she had a              
          “good faith expectation of profit.”  Burger v. Commissioner, 809            
          F.2d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1987), affg. T.C. Memo. 1985-523; see               
          Dreicer v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 642, 645 (1982), affd. without             
          published opinion 702 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  The taxpayer’s           
          expectation, however, need not be reasonable.  Burger v.                    
          Commissioner, supra; Golanty v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 411, 425              
          (1979), affd. without published opinion 647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir.              
          1981); sec. 1.183-2(a), Income Tax Regs.  Whether the taxpayer              
          has the requisite profit motive is a question of fact, to be                
          resolved on the basis of all relevant circumstances, with greater           
          weight being given to objective factors than to mere statements             
          of intent.  See Dreicer v. Commissioner, supra; Golanty v.                  
          Commissioner, supra at 426.                                                 


               4 Sec. 7491, which is effective for examinations commenced             
          after July 22, 1998, shifts the burden of proof to the                      
          Commissioner under certain circumstances.  Petitioner has not               
          raised the application of this provision.  Additionally, we                 
          cannot ascertain from the record whether respondent’s examination           
          commenced after July 22, 1998.  We therefore conclude that sec.             
          7491 does not operate to shift the bruden of proof in this case.            
          See Ashley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-376; Daya v.                    
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-360; Nitschke v. Commissioner, T.C.           
          Memo. 2000-230.                                                             





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