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potential future injuries do not qualify for exclusion under
section 104(a). See id.2
The release in this case recites a vast number of types of
claims with respect to which petitioner released Amdahl from
liability. Because the release does not specify what portion of
the payment is allocable to which claim, we look to the payor’s
intent. See id. We find that the payment in this case was not
made with the intent to compensate petitioner for personal
physical injury. First, Amdahl had not been notified of any
claim petitioner had against it concerning such injury. In
addition, the payment was made to petitioner in connection with
the termination of his employment. He was one of a group of
employees who had the option of signing an identical release in
order to obtain a superior severance package. The use of a
standardized release form in connection with the termination of a
number of employees is indicative that the payment was not on
account of personal injuries. See Laguaite v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2000-103. This is especially true in this case, where
2The cases cited here and infra remain instructive even
though they were decided prior to the amendment of sec.
104(a)(2). The section was amended by Congress with respect to
the requirement that the personal injury be physical and the
treatment of punitive damages. See H. Conf. Rept. 104-737
(1996), at 300-302, 1996-3 C.B. 1040-1042; H. Rept. 104-586
(1996), at 142-144, 1996-3 C.B. 480-482; S. Rept. 104-281 (1996),
at 115-116. Neither of these modifications bear on the case at
bar, and nothing in the statute or its legislative history
indicates that we should interpret the unaffected portion of the
statute differently than prior to amendment.
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