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issue disposed of in a way that would have allowed him to
participate in the determination. Therefore, petitioners have no
standing to assert that they have been deprived of due process on
the grounds they did not have a prior opportunity to dispute Mr.
Blonien’s partnership status.
We Also Lack Jurisdiction To Consider Petitioners’ Argument That
the Issuance of the FPAA Was Not Timely
In their petition to this Court, petitioners also challenged
the timeliness of the FPAA, arguing that the TMP’s extensions of
the period of limitations were invalid. After petitioners filed
their petition, we issued our decision in Overstreet v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-13, affd. in part and dismissed in
part 33 Fed. Appx. 349 (9th Cir. 2002), in which we held that a
Finley Kumble partner did not have standing in a partner-level
proceeding to challenge the timeliness of the FPAA. We held that
expiration of the period of limitations for issuance of the FPAA
is an affirmative defense that must be raised in a partnership-
level proceeding.
At trial, petitioners and respondent stipulated to be bound
by the final decision in the Overstreet case. Our decision in
Overstreet is now final, as a result of dismissal of the
taxpayer’s untimely appeal by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. See 33 Fed. Appx. 349 (9th Cir. 2002). On the basis of
the parties’ stipulation in the case at hand, petitioners cannot
challenge in this proceeding the validity and timeliness of the
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